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The Culture of Distrust. 
On the Hungarian National Habitus 
Miklós Hadas ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Kultur des Misstrauens. Über den nationalen Habitus Ungarns«. 
The Hungarian national habitus is reconstructed on the basis of studying some 
persistently recurring structural configurations and behavioural patterns that 
govern everyday life from the Middle Ages to the 21st century. My main thesis 
is that while the structural weight of certain institutions and social groups of 
key importance (first of all towns and urban middle classes) is insignificant in 
Hungary in the Middle Ages and in the Early Modern period, other social 
groups (nobility, gentry, peasantry) and social institutions (state, churches) are 
over-represented. Some pertinent structural homologies between three system-
level changes in the 20th century (in 1919, 1945, 1990) are also pointed out. 
Finally, on the basis of several examples, the term “national culture of distrust” 
is introduced. 
Keywords: Gentry, nobility, peasantry, urbanization deficit, passive resistance, 
emigration.  
1. Introduction 
I define habitus as behavioural patterns fixed in durable dispositions, which 
govern human praxis at the non-conscious level; being perceptible, these 
“structured, structural structures” are liable to social classification and differen-
tiation. In other words – in the wake of Norbert Elias and Pierre Bourdieu – I 
intend to grasp structurally conditioned, non-conscious, non-intentional, taken-
for-granted, durable dispositional patterns (urges, drives, tastes, feelings, incli-
nations, emotions, value preferences, etc.) that are manifest in continuous im-
provisations and can be transferred to diverse areas of practice (Bourdieu 1984, 
2001; Elias 1997). The two authors can be reduced to a common denominator 
as there is an intellectual kinship – a kind of family resemblance – between 
them, the essential component of which is, first, their qualitative and culturalist 
orientation and, second, that both think relationally.  
Elias and Dunning draw a parallel between the “parliamentarisation” of the 
squire and the “sportization” of leisure-time, arguing that the people who sent 
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the deputies to the parliament and pursued sports in one another’s company 
were motivated by similar habitus components irrespective of their political 
orientation (Elias and Dunning 1986). Their argument also warns that it would 
be ill-advised to take parliamentarianism as the cause and sporting customs as 
the effect because both phenomena are conditioned by the same structural 
specificities of 18th century English society. Similarly, Bourdieu claims that 
various existential conditions produce different habituses that can be trans-
ferred to diverse areas of practice (Bourdieu 1984). It is to be stressed: habitus 
as a system of schemes that generates practice does not only express the char-
acteristics of class position but also reveals other specificities conditioned by 
the complex structure of existential circumstances. It is therefore justified to 
speak about gender habitus, national habitus, or age-conditioned habitus (more 
precisely, about the gender, national, or age dimension of the habitus). Hence, 
when, following Elias, I write about “national habitus,” I would like to argue 
that there are patterns of thought, emotions, and actions recurring obstinately 
from generation to generation that are imprints of structures crystallized in the 
long run.  
There are, however, a few far from negligible differences between the two 
approaches: process sociology allows one to grasp more complex relations than 
the paradigm developed by Bourdieu. Elias, unlike Bourdieu, achieves this 
without extensively expatiating on habitus but instead by analysing with sensi-
tivity and acumen the complex figurations constituting the web of interdepend-
encies. Furthermore, he does not rest content with exploring the connections 
between the formations of the actual present (as “presentist” social scientists 
do), but instead places great emphasis on the study of the long-term transfor-
mation of the figurations. In The Germans (Elias 1996), trying to explain the 
emergence of Hitler’s “civilized barbarism,” he raises the question of “how the 
fortunes of a nation over the centuries become sedimented into the habitus of 
its individual members” (Elias 1996, 19).
1
 In this book, he makes an “attempt 
to tease out the developments in the German national habitus which made 
possible the civilising spurt of the Hitler-epoch, and to work out the connec-
tions between them and the long-term process of state-formation in Germany” 
(Elias 1996, 1).
2
  
As is pointed out by van Krieken (1998), Elias distinguishes four specifici-
ties of the German state-formation process: 1. the position of Germany within a 
larger figuration of nation-states; 2. the relative weakness of the German terri-
                                                             
1  In the wake of Elias, a very interesting book was also written on the Austrian and the Eng-
lish national character by Kuzmics and Axtmann (2007). 
2  Haferkamp writes that this is a “shift of emphasis from intra-societal to inter-state societal 
processes” (1987, 546), the result of which is indicated, from the second part of the 20th 
century, by a terminological change in the Eliasian oeuvre: the focus is not any more on the 
civilizing process (singular) but on civilizing processes (plural). 
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tories compared to the neighbouring states; 3. the larger number of discontinui-
ties in the development of the state; and 4. the ideological weakness of the 
bourgeoisie relative to the military aristocracy. Elias emphasises that from the 
19th century onwards nationalism is of key importance in individual identity-
formation: the unstable and fragile national identity encourages a hostility 
towards “outsiders” or “foreigners” who threaten national identity.
3
 Following 
Karl Mannheim (1952 [1928]), Elias also highlights that long-term social trans-
formations cannot be properly understood without taking into account the rela-
tions between generations.  
As it will be argued below, there are striking similarities between Germany 
and Hungary, as far as the characteristics of the national habitus and the state 
formation are concerned. In what follows, I will take a bird’s-eye-view, only 
showing the “forests” without the “trees.” My approach concentrates on the 
long-term changes of large structures and figurations of key importance, in line 
with the tradition of Norbert Elias’ process sociology. The genre is essayistic 
scientific prose, sometimes not being averse to metaphoric phrases, belonging 
to the category of rhetoric exaggeration.  
Let us start with an example: there are relatively high chances that Hungari-
ans – whether young or old, man or woman, educated or unschooled (etc.) – 
would feel inclined to cheat by not paying the fare on the tram, even in the 21st 
century (the same applies to concealing taxable income). At the same time, the 
presence of this drive has far smaller probability in a Dutch person. For him, 
the tram ticket – as part of the system of social bonds – serves the maintenance 
of the order of the nomos, hence his own interests and safety. A Dutch person’s 
dispositions, in the final analysis, are in connection with the fact that Flanders, 
as the main motor of European urban development, was a centre of mediaeval 
trade where the free burghers of free cities were liberated from the landlord’s 
jurisdiction and the feudal bonds already in the 12th-13th century and they 
could create their own legal system, self-governments, and administrative-
political bodies. Consequently, it was structurally conditioned that the Nether-
landish burghers strove to perform the activities that in ancient Rome were 
devolved upon the slaves, for when they had fulfilled their duties entailed by 
their privileges and they had paid their taxes, more remained in their wallets. In 
other words, it is related to the specificities of the long-term transformation of 
the society that the Dutch learnt to collaborate with each other and with diverse 
social institutions on the basis of mutual trust and fair play in the spirit of the 
jointly worked out system of norms. By the same token, the Dutch peasant 
became an enterprising gardener who could supply the whole of Europe with 
                                                             
3  “The cumulative effect of Germany’s disturbed history [...] facilitated the emergence of a 
particularly malignant variant of beliefs and behavioural tendencies which also arose else-
where” (Elias 1996, 329) … “The personality structure, conscience-formation and code of 
behaviour had all become attuned to this form of regime” (Elias 1996, 338). 
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his improved tulips, or Netherland painters could make portraits of self-
possessed burghers already in the 15th-16th centuries. 
When I write about a “Hungarian” or a “Dutch” person, far be it from me to 
insinuate that all Hungarian and Dutch people are identical. The simplifying 
formulation I have chosen is to suggest chances, and probabilities or, more 
precisely, types of chances and probabilities. Obviously, there are Dutch people 
who evade the fare on trams, just as there are Hungarians who would not hear 
of travelling without a ticket. That is, individual differences and social varia-
tions are put into brackets now because I concentrate on the typical and proba-
ble traits of national behavioural patterns. When I link up the inclination to 
cheat a fare with certain social specificities, I do not wish to suggest that these 
connections only pertain to the Hungarian context. Quite to the contrary: I 
think that speaking of Hungarians, I can demonstrate structural specificities of 
general validity that may appear in other structurally homological national 
settings. When apropos a 21st century tram ticket I arrive at the mediaeval 
cities after a sentence or two, I do not want to claim that the cause of a Dutch-
man’s contemporary behaviour is the Dutch urban development; all I want to 
suggest is that a national habitus is conceivable as the aggregate of behavioural 
patterns rooted in the distant past and conditioned by complex dependency 
chains in the long run. These patterns can be retrieved situationally, can be 
“hired out from the wardrobe of national behaviour” and without being clearly 
aware of their origins, they can structure with great probability the behaviour of 
people with different social embeddedness. 
In Hungary, unlike in the Netherlands, no portraits were painted of self-
conscious burghers in the 15th-16th centuries, for neither the class of self-
possessed and active urban citizens nor a professional body of painters with 
crystallized skills and inner differentiation who could depict them existed in 
that period (Although Hungarian aristocrats could easily commission paintings 
from abroad, local painters satisfying the demand of the rising bourgeoisie only 
appeared in Hungary in the late 19th century, but looking for the Eyck brothers 
or a van der Weyden among them would be in vain). While, in the Middle 
Ages, towns turned against the nobility in the Western part of Europe, and 
created their own economy and thus became the model and motor of social 
development and the emerging state institutions, the social weight of towns and 
the middle class is negligible in the history of Hungary. The inhabitants of the 
few cities that existed (mainly in Upper Hungary and Transylvania) were most-
ly not Hungarian, and in the market towns of the Great Plain it was the liberties 
of peasants which were asserted first and foremost.  
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2.  Long-Term Structural Constraints 
During the last few decades, a huge amount of scholarship has been published 
on European state formation mechanisms – mostly starting from a Weberian 
perspective. As it is well-known in Weberian parlance, the emergence of the 
state is associated with the monopolization and institutionalization of the legit-
imate means of violence and taxation and the successive democratization of 
these monopolies. The state is a “compulsory political organization” which 
controls a territorial area in which “the administrative staff successfully up-
holds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the 
enforcement of its order” (Weber 1978, 54). Weber emphasises the emergence 
of a rational legal administration, the rise of extractive capacity by a central 
government, and the legitimacy of such authority.
4
 Hendrik Spruyt (2011) 
draws attention to similarities between neo-Marxist and neo-institutionalist 
theorists of state formation, claiming that they even concur on the rise of trade 
as the harbinger of early capitalism.
5
 In fact, Anderson (1974a, 1974b) and 
North and Thomas (1973) put emphasis on the importance of urbanization, 
trade, and the emergence of the bourgeoisie – issues the lack of which has huge 
importance in the Hungarian history (as I will discuss below).  
Michael Roberts introduces the term military revolution and defines its four 
distinguishing elements: tactical revolution, the growth of the size of the army, 
the appearance of complex strategies, and the impact of the wars upon society 
(Roberts 1995). Parker (1988) adds the evolution of international martial law, 
the establishment of military academies, and the emergence of a huge literature 
on the art of war. According to these eminent military historians, there is a 
causal relationship between the military revolution and the emergence of cen-
tralized states because developments in military technology necessitate greater 
centralization and central revenue. In other words, military revolution produces 
                                                             
4  Other authors distinguish five specificities of the modern state: 1) They are ordered by 
precise boundaries with administrative control across the whole; 2) They occupy large terri-
tories with control given to organized institutions; 3) They have a capital city and are en-
dowed with symbols that embody state power; 4) The government within the state creates 
organizations to monitor, govern, and control its population through surveillance and rec-
ord keeping; 5) They increase monitoring over time (Painter and Jeffrey 2009). 
5  “These burghers (burg dwellers, from which bourgeoisie) made their living by production 
and trade and thus stood outside the traditional barter, personalized exchange that formed 
the basis of the feudal economy. Indeed, burghers were politically free from servile bonds 
unlike the peasantry (city air makes free, as the medieval adage had it). Furthermore, city-
states, city-leagues, loose confederal entities (such as the Swiss federation), and odd hybrid 
states (such as the Dutch United Provinces) held centre stage throughout late medieval and 
early modern European history. For example, many cities throughout northern Europe held 
dual allegiance to the territorial lord in their vicinity and the city-leagues of which they 
were members” (Spruyt 2011). 
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institutional innovation, which, in turn, corresponds with greater effectiveness 
on the battlefield.
6
 Tilly’s account (Tilly 1975) “melds a description of a broad 
exogenous change – the change in the nature of warfare – with a contractarian 
explanation for the rise of central authority. Central authority provided protec-
tion in exchange for revenue” (Spruyt 2011).  
As for the historiography of the Habsburg Monarchy, it is pointed out that 
from the 1970s onwards, both Hungarian (Barta 1976; Kosáry 1976; Mazsu 
1997) and non-Hungarian (Liebel 1970; Wangermann 1973; Wegert 1981; 
Ingrao 1986) historians see enlightened absolutism as an integral part of the 
struggle to overcome relative underdevelopment (see Szabo 1988, 338.) One of 
the most significant contributions to this issue is the synthetic book written by 
Evans (1979) in which the term “Central European Baroque Counter Refor-
mation mentality” is introduced. Evans’ main thesis is that – while localist 
sentiments and pockets of Protestantism survived – the consolidation of the 
Habsburg commonwealth “rested at least as much upon a set of attitudes as 
upon a set of policies,” and “an ordered, reasonably prosperous, culturally and 
politically harmonious realm" emerged in Central Europe by the early eight-
eenth century (Evans 1979, 308). Referring to another important aspect of the 
Central (Eastern) European state formation, the term “ethno-cultural homoge-
neity” is introduced, claiming that  
the state formations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were ethno-
nationalist: […] a long road lies ahead in Eastern Europe before the region can 
free itself from its lengthy captivity between the bad extremes of Empire on 
the one hand and the ethnonational Nation-State on the other. (Péteri 2000, 
367) 
Following this line of thought, in one of the most often quoted historical narra-
tives, Jenő Szűcs (1983) positions Hungary (and Central-Eastern Europe) with-
in the “three historical European regions” – i.e., between Western Europe and 
Russia. According to Szűcs, in the Western part of Europe the cumulative 
changes resulted in structural changes. The structures implied the conditions of 
their transformation, hence absolutism was only a temporary period in that part 
of the world (however many centuries it lasted for); state and society gradually 
separated and state emerged as a derivate of society. In Hungary, the five hun-
dred yearlong evolution of the West took place in one and a half centuries; 
hence it is more inorganic, rougher, vaguer, and more hybrid-like. Contracts 
based on feudal relationships were rudimentary: reciprocity and mutuality of 
the unequal partners could hardly be asserted. Further, the feudal court, the 
                                                             
6  Undoubtedly, the military revolution has some links to the emergence of centralized states, 
enlightened absolutism, and capitalism. Yet caution is advisable before a direct causal rela-
tionship is postulated. It is namely a cardinal question what is taken to be the cause and 
what is the consequence in the complex system of interdependencies. 
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chivalric milieu, and knightly culture were missing, consequently no romance 
literature evolved.  
Thus, if our goal is to reconstruct the structural conditions of the “stubbornly 
recurring long-term historical patterns” (Szűcs 1983, 11) in Hungarian society, 
it is advisable to start with the geopolitical position of the country which – as 
an external constraint – has determined the circle of possible structural variants 
and that of the dispositions they conditioned for the past one thousand years. 
While the leading states of West Europe were trying to colonize the entire 
globe and Russia could expand toward Siberia – creating the world’s largest 
state up to the Bering Strait – East-Central Europe had no possibility of expan-
sion, no outlet. The propelling force of modern development, towns, were 
founded on easily accessible seashores and riversides from antiquity (until the 
late 19th century, the Danube was not navigable upstream from the Black Sea 
through the Iron Gate, yet even so it was one of the most important infrastruc-
tural conditions of Hungarian urban development as western travellers and 
merchants arrived in the Carpathian Basin along this route from the Middle 
Ages). Though in mediaeval Europe the preponderance of waterside towns 
prevailed, from the 11th century onwards, attempts were made to colonize the 
heartland of the continent too: in the Carolingian age, lots of marshlands were 
drained, woodlands cleared, virgin soil broken, massively reducing the propor-
tion of uncultivated arable areas. 
Hungary – as part of the East-Central European region – has always been on 
the periphery of the world systems of great powers from the Middle Ages to 
our day (be it Charlemagne’s empire, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, the Habs-
burg Monarchy, the Soviet Union, or the European Union). This region has 
always been the eastern margin of the Europe-centred world economy where 
the typical partner was the large agricultural estate using villain labour. What is 
more, in the labour division of the Habsburg “world-system” the areas populat-
ed by Hungarians had a subordinated eastern position too. That explains why 
for the great colonizer countries the colonized peoples constituted the category 
of the global other, while in Central Europe the nobility in power position had 
a limited range of motion: there was little room to expand to, so the main 
chance for them was to colonize inward and downward. That is why, for the 
Hungarian nobility, the peasantry (and the embryonic middle class) became 
alien, a sort of local other. It is an eloquent indicator of the above-said that 
while the subject of cultural or social anthropology are the natives of distant 
continents, Hungarian ethnography – similarly to the other countries in the 
region – is immersed in the study of the world of the peasantry forced into 
subaltern existence. 
It is another decisive structural specificity in this region – Szűcs argues – 
that the state has excessive power, trying to modernize society from above – 
often in opposition to the nobility defending their interests. A reform-conscious 
ruler is a typical East-Central European phenomenon. The state is overgrown, 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  136 
over-bureaucratized, and when seen from below it appears an enemy, oppres-
sor, and exploiter. Not independently of this, the nobility is a disproportionately 
broad stratum amounting to some 4-5 % of the population (in Europe, the rate 
is the highest in Poland at 7-8 %). The overwhelming majority of Hungarian 
noblemen are boorishly uncultured but “imbued with the spirit of privilege” 
and a strong self-awareness as an estate, identifying themselves with – and 
excluding all other groups from – “the entire body of the country” under the 
banner of the Tripartitum.
7
 In other words: haranguing about society and nation 
it practically represented its own interests (it is characteristic that at the begin-
ning of the 19th century over half the noblemen had no land, and a quarter of 
them were so-called “curialists”, that is, they had landed property but no serfs). 
In this way, politics not only happened over the people’s heads, but the inter-
ests of the feudal estates were formulated in opposition to social freedom and 
progress. The burdens were shoved upon the peasantry: the serfs rendered 
statute labour to the squire, tithes to the church, tax to the state, and military 
service on top of all that. 
Perhaps most importantly (also mentioned by Szűcs but not with due em-
phasis), in Hungary no dense network of towns evolved. As a consequence, the 
urban way of living did not become a decisive structural factor which, owing to 
the permanent pressure for coordination, could promote the peaceful and mutu-
ally cooperative existence of diverse groups in the long run. The basic patterns 
of constructive bourgeois /middle-class habitus based on rational calculation, 
civil courage, and self-consciousness started to be crystallized in the mediaeval 
cities and implied – on a small, laboratory scale – the structural elements that 
were to give rise to the possibility of the emergence of the state and the sense 
of the nation a century or two later.  
3.  The Long Nineteenth Century 
Jenő Szűcs ended his analysis with the beginning of the 19th century, so I will 
take up my analysis from there. Undoubtedly, there were sporadic attempts in 
Hungary from the late 18th century to disseminate the spirit of the Enlighten-
ment. Without becoming immersed in the details of the 1848 revolution and the 
war of liberation, it can be stated that the vanguard of the liberal Hungarian 
nobility had a decisive role in bringing about the dualist Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy with the Compromise (1867) and perhaps the most successful half a 
century of Hungarian history could begin (unquestionably, in a closer analysis 
than a bird’s-eye-view this rough statement ought to be further refined. In the 
                                                             
7  The Tripartitum (1514) is a manual of Hungarian customary law.  The reputation attaching 
to this manual and Hungary’s insulation from the Roman Law Reception meant that the 
Tripartitum retained authority until well into the nineteenth century (see Rady 2015). 
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process sociological context of the present text, however, I think it is unambig-
uously relevant). 
One of the key elements of rocketing modernization in the second half of the 
19th century was the extension of an emancipatory strategy concerning the 
Jews by the cream of the liberal nobility inclined towards reforms. Viktor Ka-
rády’s investigations have proven (Karády and Don 1989) that since the power 
elite of the nobility needed allies to realize its social program, they offered a 
kind of “social contract of assimilation”: in return for the grant of rights, mass-
es of Jews committed themselves to assimilate into Hungarian society and to 
support the goals of the liberal Hungarian nationalism. In 1790, the Hungarian 
Diet enacted that “Jews may stay in towns” and in 1840 they were granted 
“free residence”. From 1860 onwards, they were permitted to buy land, and 
after the Compromise of 1867 they were ensured “civil and political rights”. 
This process culminated in the act of reception in 1895 which granted equal 
status to the Israelite religion with the other so-called “historical Hungarian 
churches” (Roman Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, and Unitarians), entitling 
them to the protection and support of the state. Thanks to this emancipatory 
strategy, the rate of the Jewish population increased at an unprecedented pace: 
from some 80,000 in 1784/87 (or 1.3 % of the total population) to 911,000 in 
1910 (or 5 % of the total population – in this period the whole population of the 
country almost tripled from 6.5 million to over 18 million). The Jewish pres-
ence was particularly strong in the cities, primarily Budapest. 
As part of this process, certain dispositional patterns, rooted in the ambition 
of collective survival of the Jews of the diaspora but absent in earlier Hungari-
an society, appeared. Such was the norm of maintaining a network of solidarity 
among Jews in different societies as well as the goal of coming to a compro-
mise with the ruling power which we may call – after Karády – “structural 
pacifism,” or more broadly the “political culture of non-violence.” A concomi-
tant of this structural pacifism is an intellectualism rooted in religion owing 
first of all to the Talmudic heritage. Judaic religion stipulates that all Jewish 
men must learn to read and write Hebrew. Besides, it is in their own interest to 
learn the languages used by the majority society. These patterns – besides 
being part of the rational economic behaviour – put a high price on intellectual 
goods: knowledge, science, art, and the idea and chances of progress, innova-
tion, development in general, and at the same time entail, with great probabil-
ity, the need for self-reflection, self-distance and hunger for information. The 
Jewish habitus incorporates the rejection of physical violence, a “productive 
asceticism,” lack of alcoholism, moderation in consumption, that is, a social 
praxis based on self-discipline and self-restriction. 
The dispositional patterns incorporated by Jewry fit in well with the Europe-
an bourgeois canon of virtues. The structural roots and immanent legitimation 
of these patterns crystallized in the Kantian ethics must be sought in the fact 
that the members of the middle class – unlike the nobility – were compelled to 
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work for daily subsistence and social advancement (that was also one implica-
tion I intended to hint at speaking of the Dutch and the tram ticket). The dispo-
sitional centre of the urban citizen and his way of life organized on its basis 
comprises discipline, teleological rationality, economy, foresight, readiness to 
adapt and cooperate, and the internalization of responsibility for the communi-
ty. In other words, it is built on bonds of competent men collaborating in a 
sophisticated way for the common goals. In the Middle Ages, the merchants, 
craftsmen, artisans, and officials incorporating urban masculinity are socialized 
to perform rational, thorough, and systematic work processes with discipline. 
Many different groups of people live in a city who must adapt to each other. In 
other words, a (masculine) town-dweller is socialized to suppress his violent 
drives and impulses in all dimensions of his life. He is aware that he is a cog in 
the large wheel: he knows his limitations, possibilities and prospects. It follows 
from the lengthening of the interdependency chains that a town-dweller also 
becomes capable – with great probability – of judging himself from the outside 
(self-reflection) and of identifying with the other’s position (empathy). At the 
same time, he also knows that the constraints, possibilities, and prospects in-
herent in collective existence also form the guarantee for his and his family’s 
security and future.  
This bourgeois habitus is antithetical to the hedonist nobleman’s canon of 
honour based on militant patterns of power. Essentially, it is this opposition 
that can be blamed for the aversion in Hungarian society to the patterns repre-
sented by the Jewish (and German) middle classes and for the strengthening of 
the patterns of anti-Semitic sentiments parallel with Jewish assimilation. Their 
milder 19th century forms included the ideas about the “cowardly Jew” and 
“weak Jew”, which in the interwar period expanded into an anti-Semitic ideol-
ogy, discriminative political measures, and culminated in the horrors of the 
Shoah. In a somewhat outdated fashion, we may say that the anti-Semitism of 
the counter-revolutionary regime between the two world wars stemmed from 
the logic of history (which – we know well – does not exist). It was the re-
sponse of provincial Hungary to the rapid modernization of Budapest at a daz-
zling pace as seen from the countryside. Or, to put it differently: seen from the 
countryside, Budapest was an alien tissue, a prosthesis in the body of the na-
tion.
8
  
                                                             
8  However, according to a Hungarian figure of speech of urban origin, “the greatest height 
for the Hungarian peasant is the village tower, the greatest depth is the village well, and the 
horizon is not broader than the world seen around the village.” 
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4.  The Past One Hundred Years 
There are strong structural homologies among the three political regime chang-
es of the 20th century (1919, 1945, 1990) in Hungary. First of all, in all three 
cases Hungary was forced to restart her life as a member of a fallen world-
system, having capitulated to her former enemies, deferring to their will and 
terms unconditionally after having suffered extraordinary losses and casualties. 
She had to reconfigure the future as a member of the former Central Powers 
after WWI, as one of the “last satellites” of the Axis Powers led by Germany 
after WWII, and as a member of the collapsing communist world-system in 
1990. The political changes were effected under external pressure: by the En-
tente after WWI, by the Soviets after WWII, and by “the West” after 1990. 
None of the changes were achieved by a revolution, from grass roots, for rights 
fought out from inside, in an organic revolution, with leaders and mass bases. It 
logically follows that those with an intention of change (be it a particular strat-
egy or a nation-saving vision) wanted to attain their goals within the shortest 
possible time, for it was historical experience that new powers/new rulers were 
already at the gate, so only what was attainable in the short run was worth the 
effort. In other words, selfish narrow-mindedness is structurally conditioned, 
since changes are inorganic, not engendered from inside the society but are 
determined by incalculable external factors, only the present counts, immediate 
steps must be taken. When somebody gets into a position of power, the chances 
are high that he will exploit it to create better conditions, and better financial 
standing for himself and his family – for who knows what the future will bring 
(the use of masculine personal pronouns is not accidental in this sentence). 
As a result of capitulations, the continuity, sometimes even development 
begun in previous periods is broken off: the dominant forces of the earlier 
regimes are ousted from power. It is therefore also structurally conditioned that 
(sooner or later) parvenu elites coming from below without experience in poli-
tics or administration would take the helm, relying on lower groups, sometimes 
openly on the mob. After the consolidation of the Horthy regime, representa-
tives of the traditional national aristocracy took the dominant political positions 
(it suffices to name two prime ministers, Counts Pál Teleki
9
 and István Beth-
len
10
), but it is symptomatic that, from the thirties, the aristocrats (among whom 
there was a considerable number of Anglophiles) were squeezed back into the 
Upper House with restricted power and tried to oppose the actions of the ex-
treme right timidly from there. Gyula Gömbös
11
 was the son of a Lutheran 
                                                             
9  Count Pál Teleki (1879-1941), Prime Minister of Hungary from 1920 to 1921 and from 1939 
to 1941. After the invasion of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany, he committed suicide. 
10  Count István Bethlen (1874-1946), Prime Minister of Hungary from 1921 to 1931. 
11  Gyula Gömbös (1886-1936), military officer and politician, served as Prime Minister of 
Hungary from 1932 to 1936.  
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teacher with German ancestors; Ferenc Szálasi
12
 was born to a poor clerk’s 
family with Armenian-Slovak-Ruthenian background. 
It was typical of the cadre polity of the 1950s that members of the earlier 
elites were expelled (be they aristocrats, Jewish middle-class members, or even 
farmers) and uneducated leaders from among workers and agrarian labourers 
were put in power positions. It is also true that during the decades of the Kádár 
regime,
13
 a reform-oriented nomenklatura with professional and political quali-
ties also emerged. In this period, the parvenu elite had enough time to profes-
sionalize and coalesce into a more or less competent ruling estate; that is to say, 
compared to the interwar period and after 1990 when the system led by nation-
al conservative political classes gradually shifted toward a right-wing national-
ist-populist direction – from the Teleki government to Szálasi’s rule, from the 
Antall cabinet
14
 to Orbán’s government – in the era between these two periods 
the process was reversed: from the extreme leftist Rákosi dictatorship
15
 of the 
fifties it moved toward a more consolidated state from the sixties onwards. 
After the fall of communism, the logic of elite recruitment resembled again 
the interwar period: with the Antall cabinet, first some centre-right representa-
tives of the Christian conservative Europe-oriented ruling class sunken “under-
ground” for the earlier two periods re-appeared (the majority of whom consti-
tuted the inner Christian middle-class opposition with Anglophile orientation to 
the Nazi-oriented Arrow Cross party), and had to vie later for power with the 
former communist reform-oriented elite and the urban intellectuals. Despite all 
their ideological differences, the rival groups of the Hungarian political elite of 
the nineties shared one thing: they had organic social embeddedness. They 
represented (1) the Christian rural and urban middle and lower middle classes 
with nationalist sentiments (MDF), (2) the masses elevated to a petit bourgeois 
existence by the Kádár regime (MSZP), and (3) the Western-oriented, middle-
class intellectuals and professionals of Budapest (SZDSZ). József Antall Jr., 
Gyula Horn,
16
 and Iván Pető17 were authentic incorporations of these social 
backgrounds, value systems, and dispositional patterns.  
                                                             
12  Ferenc Szálasi (1897-1946), leader of the Nazi-style Arrow Cross Party, being both Head of 
State and Prime Minister for the final six months of Hungary's participation in World War II. 
Hanged for war crimes and high treason in 1946. 
13  János Kádár (1912-1989), General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 
(MSZMP) from 1956 to 1988.  
14  József Antall Jr. (1932-1993), librarian, historian, and the first democratically elected Prime 
Minister of Hungary after the fall of communism (1990 – 1993); leader of the central right-
wing Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) between 1989 and 1993.  
15  Mátyás Rákosi (1892-1971), ardent Stalinist, leader of the Hungarian Communist Party from 
1945 to 1956. 
16  Gyula Horn (1932–2013), foreign minister in Hungary’s last Communist government in 
1989-90; socialist Prime Minister from 1994 to 1998.  
17  Iván Pető (1946-), historian, one of the founders of SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats), 
leader of SZDSZ from 1992 to 1997. 
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Compared to these parties, the young leaders of FIDESZ, mainly born in the 
mid-1960s, arrived from the countryside, from the transitional milieu of small 
settlements, small towns, small existences, grey economy, and household plots 
of the Kádár-regime. They are neither peasants nor bourgeois or workers; nei-
ther urban nor village people, and they are mostly untouched by the influence 
of religion. They come from the social nowhere, as it were. In their youth these 
talented politicians with “Sturm und Drang”-energies were able to formulate 
progressive, value-attached, and radical utopias. But the ecstasy of power be-
witched them; for lack of embedded cultural patterns they had no internal 
moral checks and balances on the basis of which they could have initiated the 
building up of external institutional checks and balances. This new elite was 
not in possession of the aristocracy’s canon of honour, or the bourgeoisie’s 
canon of virtue, or again, of the lower classes’ (first of all the peasantry’s) 
disciplined and submissive canon of work disciplined by privations. While in 
the interwar years, treason and lying were inadmissible owing the aristocracy’s 
canon of honour, and an intolerable moral dilemma had no solution, so suicide 
was the only way out – as in Count Pál Teleki’s case –, the FIDESZ leaders 
have no moral scruples; they only have cynical, Machiavellian power techno-
logical expertise. For them, politics is rhetorical technique and political market-
ing subordinated to the attainment of their own material and power goals. Con-
science is the indicator of weakness in their eye. Only this parvenu, cynical, 
arrogant, and immoral mentality could make Viktor Orbán, the Hungarian 
Prime Minister declare, speaking about the refugee crisis, that when “it is about 
the safety of the people […] we may ignore the humanitarian claptrap.” 
In all three cases – weirdly reproducing centuries-old patterns – an over-
bureaucratized, overgrown state apparatus is built up with a tendency toward 
autocracy, subordinated to the dominant party/parties. The power elites – simi-
larly to the reform-conscious rulers of earlier ages – wish to transform society 
from above and fill the key positions according to loyalty and reliability instead 
of expert knowledge. Hugely inflated neo-corporative elites of up to a million 
members come about. A cumbersome, intricate, and euphuistic bureaucracy 
with a touch of favouritism and nepotism is paired with over-hierarchized 
office apparatuses. The state takes the stance of authority toward the people: it 
instructs, obliges, orders; it distrusts and punishes, and changes the legal rules 
at will. The settlements are ruled by swell-headed town-clerks, council presi-
dents, and mayors; the gendarme address the day-labourer with undue familiar-
ity, the police may check the documents of a young man any time, a mayor 
may withdraw the possibility of communal work for the unruly behaviour of 
the local youth. Seen from the perspective of the lower strata, the state is the 
synonym of amusement for the idle rich, of deceiving the people, excessively 
entangled administration, and arranging matters above the people’s heads. The 
state is the enemy and the exploiter in all three periods: strangers in suits ap-
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pearing in the villages are received with the mistrust due to the agents of alien 
and oppressive powers. 
These features are relatively well known. What is less widely known is that 
in all three periods in Hungary, a masculine political culture crystallized. On 
the first count, this category suggests that the power positions are almost exclu-
sively filled by men. Women in the political elite are, at most, exceptions that 
prove the rule. Besides, their influence, if they are present at all, is negligible. 
(It is to be noted that the political sphere was dominated by men in the whole 
western world until the end of the 20th century, thus Hungary hardly deviated 
from the mainstream in this regard. In the 21st-century EU, however, Hungary 
considerably differs from the majority; for except Malta, the rate of female 
ministers and MPs is the lowest here, particularly conspicuously after 2010). 
Far more importantly than this biological fact, the Hungarian power elites in 
the past one hundred years have almost exclusively constituted of men who 
pursued politics on the basis of the masculine habitus. This context confirms 
that the overgrown state is actually a patriarchal state organized on the model 
of paternal authority crystallized in the family in which this peremptory, conde-
scending attitude and bearing expressing paternal authority prevails. The state 
and the political elite expect the citizens to be quasi vassals; instead of profes-
sional expertise and competence, the knowledge to rule becomes the basis for 
selection mechanisms of state bureaucrats. Speaking of the “indolence” of the 
state which does not render services but acts like an authority, treating the 
citizens as subjects not partners, pinpoints the quintessence of the patriarchal 
authoritarian model. It is obvious and demonstrable in this context that the 
power elite’s nepotistic world is practically organized on the basis of the logic 
of masculine bonds that transfer the relations of patriarchal clans into the realm 
of politics, similarly to other masculine institutions of the country: the pubs, 
casinos, academy of sciences, hospital managements, and stock exchange 
councils. 
Looking for the core of this masculine political culture, we might conclude 
that in all three periods at issue the praxis of the power elite is structured by the 
urges of libido dominandi, to use Bourdieu’s term (Bourdieu 2001). In other 
words, men in dominant positions are predisposed to fight in diverse areas of 
life, to pursue activities the most extreme instance of which is war. The majori-
ty of Hungarian politicians wage real or symbolic wars – against external and 
internal foes. The identification of the enemy created on the basis of martial 
rhetoric paves the way for hatred: in all three periods, the legitimation of the 
regime is built on an enemy image organized around a central ideology of 
hatred. What was in focus was not a positive future-oriented utopia, but an 
emotionally motivated negative knowledge implying revenge determined by 
the past – hatred is usually targeted at (presumed) representatives of the preced-
ing regime. More precisely, there is a kind of utopian image of the future – 
practically the inverse of the vision of the present enemy image motivated by 
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past grievances projected into the future, be it the greatness and independence 
of the Hungarian nation (as in the Horthy and Orbán regimes) or the vision of 
communism (in the Kádár regime). 
In the Horthy regime, bound by the spell of the Trianon-treaty-shock (the 
loss of two-thirds of the country’s former territories after WW1), hatred was 
aimed at first at external enemies (primarily the neighbouring nations), fol-
lowed by the internal foe: the Jew. In the communist period, a cold war was 
waged in which the West and the exploiters were the arch enemies and their 
representatives at home: rich farmers, the bourgeoisie, and aristocrats already 
without power. After the collapse of communism, the main scapegoats were the 
communists, then, after a generation’s time – an eerie recurrence of history – 
the Jew would appear again, followed by the “migrant.” In all these periods, of 
course, Hungarians have their own underclass, the Gypsies, who can be hated 
at will. In all three periods the Hungarian nation became, apart from the com-
mon language, a hatred-bounded community. 
In the first two periods, this martial attitude and enemy image were identical 
with those of the countries in the same league (Germany in the interwar years, 
the Soviet Union after WWII), so it may be said in their defence that these 
constructions were (also) created in response to external pressure. The specific-
ity of the construction of the enemy created in the second decade of the 21st 
century is that now there is no external pressure or compulsion; the Hungarian 
ruling elite has initiated and maintains the quasi warlike situation with a view 
to their goals. The Orbán regime generates a civilizing war and a quasi-war of 
independence. The novelty compared to the previous periods is that the target 
groups are actually fictitious: the political elite wages a rhetorical war against 
its own world-system (“let’s stop Brussels”) while it enjoys all the advantages 
(EU subsidies) of belonging to this world-system. The civilizing war is also 
fictitious, for there are hardly any refugees in Hungary; yet the peerlessly evil 
and cynical government propaganda of incredible intensity has managed to 
instil fear and hatred of them in the citizens. Their campaign is capable of 
resuscitating the most atrocious reflexes of the fascist period by inciting the 
susceptible public against the American businessman and philanthropist of 
Hungarian-Jewish origin, George Soros (and hence against Jews, capitalists, 
the West, and their hirelings at home) – with frightening success. 
This symbolic or real warlike spirit and general atmosphere based on this 
masculine world-view also implies a shocking similarity in the politics of sport 
adopted by the power elites of all three periods. The symbolic capital objecti-
fied in sport expertise is expropriated by the state, thereby trying to legitimate 
its power. In the official discourses, sports appear as carriers of national excel-
lence, with the implicit aim to contribute to the construction of self-legitimating 
and self-glorifying national mythologies and a sense of patriotic superiority. 
That is the unreflective, masculine strategy of the semi-peripheral regimes 
based on a politics of grievances and enemy images imbued with inferiority 
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complexes; in this regard, Hungary resembles the rest of the – small – semi-
peripheral nations proud of their specialities and often laden with complexes 
who, from a social psychological perspective, have a lot to counterbalance. 
That is, there are good chances that the peacock effect works: the political elite 
manages to make believe that the national community is larger, more outstand-
ing, and glorious than it is. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, sports successes were still organically 
tied to the strategies of diverse social groups. A wonderful example is the Hun-
garian “assimilation race,” starting at the end of the 19th century, between the 
Jews and Germans, an accurate indicator of which is the rivalry between two 
sport clubs, the MTK with a majority of Hungarians of Jewish origin and 
Ferencváros (Fradi) founded mainly by Hungarians of German origin (Hadas 
2000). In the interwar years, the powerful Minister of Culture and Education, 
Kuno Klebelsberg, summed up the essence of the sports policy of the regime: 
“We must make sure that the physical training earlier ensured for the entire 
male population by the army should be seen to by the Hungarian sports today” 
(Nemzeti Sport [National Sport], 24 December 1928). Sports successes had 
salient importance for the communist politicians, too (Hadas 2010).
18
 Concern-
ing its sports policy, in particular the huge budget of a thousand billion HUF, 
the Orbán regime – with its stadium building spree, suspicious legal arrange-
ments aimed at channeling taxes into sports, organizing international sports 
events, and its irrational dream of hosting the Olympics – fits shockingly into 
this century-old trend.  
5.  Collective Strategies and Objectifications 
To grasp the obstinately recurring behavioural patterns one may resort to the 
well-known categories of Hirschman as the starting point: exit, voice, and loy-
alty. It is to be stressed that the ideal typical strategies discussed below have no 
sharp dividing lines between them. On the one hand, some acts may rightly be 
subsumed under several headings – for example, Béla Bartók’s
19
 or Lajos Kos-
suth’s
20
 emigration was also a voiced protest. On the other hand, remaining 
                                                             
18  A seemingly authentic anecdote: on a Monday morning in 1949 the Hungarian Communist 
dictator, Mátyás Rákosi, asks his secretary about the result of the Fradi vs Vasas football 
match the previous day. The secretary does not know it, for – he says – he had to deal with 
far more important political questions. Rákosi’s response: “sport is a particularly important 
political question, especially when a ‘left-wing’ and a ‘right-wing’ football team are in-
volved.” 
19  Béla Bartók (1881-1945), composer, pianist, and ethnomusicologist. He is considered one of 
the most important composers of the 20th century. 
20  Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894), nobleman, lawyer, journalist, politician, statesman and Gover-
nor-President of the Kingdom of Hungary during the revolution of 1848-49. Internationally 
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with Bartók’s and Kossuth’s example, individual strategies might change in 
time: exit may follow an unsuccessful use of voice. Thirdly, the self-destructive 
or submerging forms of exit may mingle with or result in loyalty. Fourthly, 
individual ideologies and system-level consequences may deviate: a submerg-
ing person may delude him/herself that s/he is performing passive resistance, 
whereas the lack of action serves the survival of the regime. 
Let us start with the category of protesters or voice, the least populous group 
of those cited above. There are few revolutions in Hungarian history – and 
there is no successful revolution in the strict sense at all. It is, however, un-
doubted that the revolutions of 1848 and 1956 are among the most magnificent 
events of Hungarian history, which – though ending in failure – had a decisive 
role in promoting a relatively successful consolidation period which followed 
quite soon after (what is more, the dualist monarchy that started with the Com-
promise in 1867 is the period of most dynamic development in Hungarian 
history). The earliest attempts to fight for “freedoms” were made by the peas-
antry in the 15th-16th centuries. In this regard, mention can be made of the free 
peasants who had the obligation to take up arms, the inhabitants of frontier 
zones, the remnants of the warring estate. These groups were capable of stout, 
stubborn, consistent resistance in the village communities; these strategies 
undoubtedly promoted the mobility of the peasants, the acquisition of certain 
communal rights, and the relaxation of the “grip” of exploitation.  
Taking stock of the Hungarian revolutions and the more or less iconic fig-
ures of these revolutions, we find individual fates almost always ended in fail-
ure. This is partly because the radical revolutionaries are few and get isolated – 
the moderate majority only siding with them at first and gradually falling off 
from them – and partly because external forces sooner or later defeated them. 
The leaders of peasant revolutions in the 15th-16th centuries were sentenced to 
terribly cruel deaths; Prince Francis II Rákóczi, the leader of the Hungarian 
uprising against the Habsburgs in 1703-11, died alone in exile; Sándor Petőfi, 
the national poet, fell on the battlefield in 1849 at the age of 26. In the 20th 
century, the fate of the two most important poets ended in failure: Endre Ady 
was syphilitic and alcoholic; Attila József committed suicide. Imre Nagy, Pál 
Maléter, and other revolutionaries of 1956 were executed. The artists and dis-
senters of the Kádár regime either turned into alcoholics or in luckier cases 
they became the magi of peripheral subcultures (the list is of course incom-
plete, dozens of names are missing, but it may suffice to suggest that in Hunga-
ry it is almost impossible to have a successful career if someone is a revolu-
tionary). It was perhaps the filmmaker, Miklós Jancsó alone among the artists 
of the highest order who – exceptions strengthen the rule – was highly es-
teemed by both the international professional community and the official cul-
                                                                                                                                
honoured freedom fighter whose bronze bust can be found in the United States Capitol. 
About Kossuth, see Morgan’s (2019) interesting article on celebrities. 
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tural policy of the Kadar regime, in addition to a considerable international 
career.  
The group of those who can be ranged under the exit heading is far more 
populous. In Hungarian history four basic types of exit can be differentiated: 
migration, emigration, self-destruction, and submersion. One end of spectrum 
is marked by the few protesters-turned-exiles (like Kossuth and Bartók), at the 
other end are the millions of loyal people submerged. Typically, one of the 
sparks that triggered off the peasant revolt in 1437 was the limitation of free 
migration. The Hungarian peasants had the right to move from the early 14th 
century. There was thus a possible route of escape for the most mobile groups 
of the peasantry, amounting to 90 per cent of the population, which held out the 
promise of the alleviation of their burdens from the late Middle Ages onward. 
That said, domestic mobility (“horizontal mobility”) did not assume mass pro-
portions before the 19th century. 
It was in the period of the dualist Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867-1918) 
that emigration first reached a large extent, millions “tottering” out of the coun-
try. During the interwar period, the intensity of emigration somewhat de-
creased, but it did not stop. To remain with sociology: after the 1920s the emi-
gration of Jewish intellectual and artistic elite assumed dramatic dimensions: 
people who would later become world famous left Hungary. These included: 
Károly (Karl) Mannheim, the founder of the sociology of knowledge and the 
tutor of Norbert Elias, and one of the founders of British sociology; Arnold 
Hauser, the founder of the sociology of arts; and Károly and Mihály Polányi, 
social scientists who enjoyed soaring international careers (the loss through 
emigration affects the second generation as well: Mihály Polányi’s son, János 
Polányi, who was born in Berlin won the Nobel Prize in chemistry; another 
Nobel-Prize winner, the economist Milton Friedman who was born in New 
York in 1912, was also the offspring of emigrant Hungarian Jews. And these 
examples are only the tip of the iceberg). There are world-famous Hungarian 
musicians from the conductor György Solti to the operetta-composer Imre 
Kálmán, and natural scientists and mathematicians of great stature such as 
János (John) Neumann and Leó Szilárd (not to speak of such celebrities as the 
famous illusionist and stunt performer Harry Houdini, born as Emil Weisz in 
Budapest, or the renowned football coach Béla Gutmann, who discovered 
Eusebio among others, and who is still the first to be named by any Lisbon taxi 
driver when Hungarians are to be identified). With the masses emigrating in 
1945, 1956, and the 21st century, the sheer number of Hungarians emigrating 
has risen to several million (out of 10-12 million). 
Special versions of exit include slow or fast self-annihilation or self-
destruction from suicide to alcoholism. The rate of suicides is saliently high in 
Hungary in international comparison: only four successor states to the Soviet 
Union – Lithuania, Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan – are ahead of Hungarians. 
According to mortality statistics, deaths due to chronic liver disorder or cirrho-
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sis place the country in the top echelon in Europe, particularly among men. 
These figures, however, only refer to the visible tip of the iceberg: the culture 
of drinking, starting the day with “pálinka,” a shot of 52
o 
proof brandy, the 
amount of alcohol consumed at a family dinner; “drowning sorrow in wine” are 
deeply embedded in the Hungarian cultural sphere in nearly every social class. 
Submersion – or, to cite the late Prime Minister, József Antall Jr. “going out 
with the tide” – is a way of living when citizens do not identify with the ruling 
power but they do not turn against it either by taking steps to change the status 
quo. Their voice, protest or dissent, is restricted to the closed circles of family 
and friends, for the submerging people think they have no chance to change the 
existing conditions. People with a penchant for ideologies may delude them-
selves with the myth that they actually practice the traditional Hungarian “pas-
sive resistance”. They “get out of the way of power,” “they bow to it but do not 
give in,” “they don’t pay their taxes,” “don’t declare their income or wealth.” 
Referring to Ferenc Deák
21
, they hold that it is a “unique phenomenon in world 
history” that “with the politics of passivity”, “through passive resistance the 
Hungarian nation” is able to crush the strength of oppression. 
Actually, the strategies of the submerging only differ from those of the obe-
dient – the category that includes the overwhelming majority of Hungarian 
citizens – in the need to create ideological legitimation. Of course, the mantle 
of the loyal also covers a wide range from those who reluctantly join to those 
eager beavers who pretend enthusiasm and manifest their loyalty with spec-
tacular lip service. The submerged and the obedient think that all they can do is 
grumble, sulk, complain, and perform verbal acrobatics supported by high 
volume. While they can work hard like a horse (that is, they let themselves be 
exploited), they do not dare to stand up in public for their views whispered in 
family circles or over the card table. It has been the experience of several cen-
turies that politics is the amusement of the idle rich, hence they take the politi-
cians for a pack of swindlers, so they avenge themselves by cheating wherever 
they can, and consequently opine that every Hungarian is a dishonest cheater. It 
follows that when they can, they do not pay their tax or validate their tram 
ticket, and are extremely sorry for themselves for all this, permeated by the 
feeling that they have already been sadly punished for past and future. They 
make merry in the pub in tears for they cannot live without music. And in in-
toxicated moments they bravely call out “stop” but when the dawn, the dewy 
dawn arrives, they back out, all zeal flickering out suddenly. They stubbornly 
stick to what they are used to and their “frog’s-eye-view” convinces them that 
their little gardens are the centre of the world (“Great joy in a little garden” 
was the title of a gardening manual in the Kádár era). In official situations they 
have a servilely respectful attitude toward officialdom, yet deep at heart they 
                                                             
21  Ferenc Deák (1800-1876), politician, "the Wise Man of the Nation," led the Hungarian 
delegation that signed the Compromise with Austria in 1867.  
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feel the contempt of the oppressed sunken into helplessness. They tend to scorn 
anyone who does not fit their limited scope of life, and since this implies that 
almost their entire surroundings must be treated with contempt, they become 
lonely, which, in turn, generates great self-pity. They always know everything 
better, do not trust anyone, especially any other Hungarian, so they are ready 
for hatred any time. The masters of political alchemy know this perfectly well, 
and all they have to do is to find a surface for this demand for hatred to be 
projected onto. 
However, submerging and obedient Hungarians are highly creative as far as 
the survival exercises in (sloppy) dictatorships are concerned. They are brilliant 
at overtaking each other at the revolving door, practicing and interpreting law 
with talent, reasoning with ingenuous turns and twists, and especially in the 
everyday world of fudging, botchery, and trickery (i.e., in the dimension of 
creative masculine bricolage). An iconic tangible objectification of these dis-
positional elements is the csettegő [clapper] of the Kádár era and occasionally 
of today’s countryside: a slow-moving homemade truck. The virtuoso bri-
coleur, the man-of all-work who pieces together this unique vehicle on a par 
with folklore artefacts uses anything he found in the shed at the rear of the 
garden or in the friend’s workshop. Iron parts of defunct war vehicles, under-
carriages of Dodges, Jeeps, GAZ and ZIS cars, the re-polished body of his 
father’s Trabant, bicycle chains, MIA, Pannonia, MIB and other motors origi-
nally belonging to submersible pumps, grinders or band-saws (be they single-
cylinder gasoline consuming or two-cylinder petrol consuming motors), UAZ 
brake slave cylinders, driving-rod bearings, polished valves, rewound dynamos, 
tuned-up self-starters and V-belt pulleys, Pannonia wheels and combine-
harvester chains – not to speak of the KAMAZ driving wheel and the tilting 
plateau of an IVECO truck… 
The typical Hungarian heroes of humble birth belong in this context, as do 
the stunts crystallized into folk legends by members of the national golden 
eleven football squad of the 1950s, hallmarked by the name of Ferenc Puskás: 
trading in anoraks, practical jokes, pranks, including the strikers challenging 
the defenders to a joke contest, or the rumours that the soccer players spent 
their free time playing cards and billiard and going to horse races. In this cul-
ture, stealing a ball in childhood (as Puskás did) is the sign of shrewdness and 
dexterity and not of poverty, and boozing is an indispensable element of daily 
life. It can be suggested that these components of everyday praxis must also 
have greatly contributed to the evolution of the tactical and stylistic arsenal of 
Hungarian football, to the Golden Team becoming the best of the world in the 
1950s. 
The works of Hungarian high and popular arts are basically nourished by the 
experiences of rural Hungary, offering reminiscences of one’s roots, the nostal-
gia for the home to the urban public as well (it is to be borne in mind that in the 
20th century 90 per cent of the population of Budapest were of rural origin; 
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there was hardly any family without parents, grandparents, or other relatives 
living in the countryside). First and foremost, that applies to the most Hungari-
an of all genres, magyar nóta [Hungarian popular song], which are played just 
as often by Gypsy musicians in the Budapest restaurants as in the taverns and 
pubs of villages and small towns. These songs draw on the experience of rural 
people of peasant origin; they are typically characterized by nostalgia, a sad 
longing for the past, inability to act, acquiescence in the unchangeable, the 
acceptance or experience of the sacrificial role. This is the emotional founda-
tion on which the “coffee-house song” (like the Szomorú vasárnap [Gloomy 
Sunday]), i.e., the 20th century urban version of the Hungarian popular song – 
a kind of Hungarian saudade – are built. Their musical structure is similar to 
magyar nóta and reduces tough men to tears after the fourth shot of brandy in 
the pub. Coffee-house songs are expressions of hopelessness, self-pity, inertia, 
which legitimate the abortive life of the masculine hero sunken and enclosed in 
his small-time, insignificant existence. The third popular Hungarian genre, 
operetta also places its narrative into the countryside: the protagonists of 
“Csárdáskirálynő” [The Csárdás Princess], “Marica grófnő” [Countess Mari-
tza], “Lili bárónő” [Baroness Lili], or “Mágnás Miska” [Mickey Magnate] 
demonstrate how the realm of the gentry and the aristocracy operate as a refer-
ent for the urban (petit) bourgeoisie with rural roots but cherishing the illusion 
of social rising. 
By the same token, until the mid-20th century the subject matter of the can-
on of literature and “classical music” were primarily found in the world of rural 
Hungary. This was inevitable until the last third of the 19th century, as no 
urban culture that could be the subject of reflection and representation existed 
before that date. The emerging romantic novels and national operas predomi-
nantly dealt with the responsibility centred, elevated life and problems of the 
aristocracy and the nobility, while the representation of rural existence merged 
almost unnoticed with the representation of the past. Zoltán Kodály’s
22
 efforts 
to find the “pure source” in peasant music are also part of the romantic anti-
urban efforts (at the beginning Bartók also shared this approach under Kodály’s 
influence, but from the 1920s onwards, he gradually distanced himself from 
Kodály). It is thus a consequence that artists of great stature nurtured by urban 
existence were positively received and exerted their influence mainly abroad, 
and not in Hungary. 
Or one might take Gyula Krúdy (1878-1933), the genius of the Hungarian 
literature, who also predominantly depicted his rural reminiscences in his prose 
(describing Buda in the first part of the 20th century as a rural milieu). It is 
perhaps not too far-fetched to presume that his unhappy life, alcoholism, and 
impoverishment derived from the fact that he wanted to conquer the urban 
                                                             
22  Zoltán Kodály (1882-1967), composer, ethnomusicologist, pedagogue. He is known as the 
creator of the “Kodály Method of music education”. 
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world using the emotional dispositions of an archaic, rural world of gentry. 
That is, history past him by. Remarkably, in 1971, the cult film Sindbad, based 
on Krúdy’s novel, was able to re-kindle the reminiscences of the gentry’s 
world. The protagonist is a latent anti-hero reborn in the situation of anomie, 
who literally embodies the connotations buried in the subconscious of society. 
The naked women projected from his fancy onto the screen activate the libidi-
nous phantasies of old and new masculine generations, legitimating the mascu-
line domination of the everyday life (see Hadas 2003). 
6.  Conclusion 
In this essay, I have tried to identify patterns of thought, emotions, and actions 
recurring obstinately from generation to generation. I have argued that, histori-
cally, no dense network of towns evolved in Hungary; consequently, neither 
the bourgeoisie nor the urban way of life became decisive structural factors. 
Middle classes did not step onto the stage of history before the second half of 
the 19th century, but then, when they did, they were comprised mainly of for-
eign – Jewish and German – elements. Hence, the Hungarian national habitus 
can be traced to the social position and dispositional patterns of two social 
classes with great structural weight: the nobility and the peasantry, positioning 
themselves in opposition to Budapest and bourgeois middle classes. There were 
unbridgeable gulfs between, and even within, social groups: noblemen detested 
not only the peasantry but also other noblemen of somewhat lower rank, and 
they did not keep it a secret. Similarly, a rich peasant regarded himself as supe-
rior to the strongly stratified masses of the peasantry beneath him and treated 
the landless with haughty mistrust and communicated with his family members 
in a patriarchal manner. In the long run, on the basis of these structurally condi-
tioned, stubbornly recurring dispositional patterns, a culture of distrust 
emerged and became institutionalized in Hungary. 
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